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ABSTRACT
This Essay describes emerging big data technologies that facilitate horizontal
cybersurveillance. Horizontal cybersurveillance makes possible what has been termed
as “sentiment analysis.” Sentiment analysis can be described as opinion mining and
social movement forecasting. Through sentiment analysis, mass cybersurveillance
technologies can be deployed to detect potential terrorism and state conflict, predict
protest and civil unrest, and gauge the mood of populations and subpopulations.
Horizontal cybersurveillance through sentiment analysis has the likely result of chill-
ing expressive and associational freedoms, while at the same time risking mass data
seizures and searches. These programs, therefore, must be assessed as adversely
impacting a combination of constitutional rights, such as simultaneously affecting
both First and Fourth Amendment freedoms.
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INTRODUCTION
Big data1 facilitates frictionless surveillance2 for the sake of cybersurveillance.3
In big data cybersurveillance regimes, anyone engaging in digital communications
can be either a source of data to fuel the cybersurveillance machine or a legitimate
target of investigation.4 Because of the scope of developing technologies, even public
presentation of one’s face or body can be subjected to data storage, collection, and
analysis.5 Thus, theoretically, any activity or non-activity can be captured by cyber-
surveillance technologies that in turn subject the individual to a much larger cyber-
surveillance apparatus. Other technologies seek to capture and analyze content for
community sentiment, potential crimes, or threats of terrorism.6 Such technologies
include “social radar” technologies, which can “rapidly achieve situational awareness
of the human environment, identify alternative courses of action—whether through
words or deeds—and better understand the potential outcomes of those actions.”7
1 The phenomenon of what has been termed the “big data revolution” has been the focus of
extensive and important research. See, e.g., BIG DATA CHALLENGES: SOCIETY, SECURITY, IN-
NOVATION AND ETHICS (Anno Bunnik et al. eds., 2016) [hereinafter BIG DATA CHALLENGES];
BIG DATA: AN EXPLORATION OF OPPORTUNITIES, VALUES, AND PRIVACY ISSUES (Cody
Agnellutti ed., 2014); JAMES R. KALYVAS & MICHAEL R. OVERLY, BIG DATA: A BUSINESS
AND LEGAL GUIDE (2015); PRIVACY IN THE MODERN AGE: THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS
(Marc Rotenberg et al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter PRIVACY SOLUTIONS]; danah boyd & Kate
Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a Cultural, Technological, and
Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 662 (2012).
2 See, e.g., ZYGMUNT BAUMAN & DAVID LYON, LIQUID SURVEILLANCE: A CONVER-
SATION (2013); Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721 (2014).
3 See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 3 (2008) (“Government’s increasing use of surveillance and data mining is a predictable
result of accelerating developments in information technology. As technologies that let us
discover and analyze what is happening in the world become ever more powerful, both gov-
ernments and private parties will seek to use them.” (citations omitted)).
4 See, e.g., AnnaMaria Andriotis & Emily Glazer, Banks Weigh Shift from Equifax:
TransUnion, Experian Are Poised to Pick Up Business in the Wake of Big Data Breach, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 13, 2017, at B14.
5 See, e.g., James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Collecting Millions of Faces from Web
Images, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2014, at A1 (discussing how the Snowden disclosures showed the
NSA used facial recognition technology on images taken from the Internet); Nate Berg, What
Happens When You Ask to See CCTV Footage?, GUARDIAN (Sept. 22, 2015, 2:30 EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/sep/22/cctv-cameras-capture-almost-every-move
-on-city-streets-what-happens-when-you-ask-to-see-the-footage [https://perma.cc/2YJZ-8D3C]
(“In the United States, where citywide surveillance systems, police car-mounted automated
license plate readers and body-worn cameras are being adopted across the country, many are
concerned about the lack of regulations controlling how this data is being collected, stored
and made available, especially when the collection is happening in public spaces.”).
6 See infra Part I.
7 Social Radar Technologies, MITRE CORP., https://www.mitre.org/research/technology
-transfer/technology-licensing/social-radar-technologies [https://perma.cc/ESX4-7B69] (last
visited Dec. 4, 2017).
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Constitutional law scholars Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson warn that the “Na-
tional Surveillance State” is upon us.8 In the National Surveillance State, a ubiquitous
surveillance governance system “will be developed by Congress and particularly by
military and civilian bureaucracies within the executive branch.”9 Such a state would
rely on “surveillance, data collection, collation, and analysis to identify problems,
to head off potential threats, to govern populations, and to deliver valuable social
services.”10 Balkin explains that the National Surveillance State will use surveillance
and analysis conducted by private parties as a feature of governance.11 Surveillance
technologies developed by corporations, as well as by defense contractors, have
been provided to public law enforcement agencies.12
In the United States, the law has yet to match the speed with which cybersurveil-
lance technologies have developed, and many scholars have theorized how the law
can—or should—change to keep pace with technology and to preserve constitu-
tional protections.13 The Constitution reflects metaphysical ambitions14 and a natural
8 See generally Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional
Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 489 (2006).
9 Id. at 490.
10 Balkin, supra note 3, at 3.
11 Id. at 4.
12 See generally Heidi Boghosian, The Business of Surveillance, 39 A.B.A. HUM. RTS.
2, 2–5, 23 (2013).
13 See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326 (2015);
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 547 (2017);
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 104
CALIF. L. REV. 805 (2016); Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amend-
ment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681 (2011); David Gray & Danielle Keats
Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381 (2013); David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right
to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013); Stephen E. Henderson, Real-Time and
Historic Location Surveillance After United States v. Jones: An Administrable, Mildly Mosaic
Approach, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803 (2013); Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjust-
ment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011); Orin S. Kerr, Apply-
ing the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2010);
Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285 (2015);
Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 Mich L. Rev. 311 (2012);
Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations of Privacy, Fourth Amend-
ment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 205; Rachel Levinson-Waldman,
Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance
in Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 527 (2017); Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, A Lot More
than a Pen Register, and Less than a Wiretap: What the StingRay Teaches Us About How Con-
gress Should Approach the Reform of Law Enforcement Surveillance Authorities, 16 YALE J.L.
& TECH. 134 (2013); Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Sur-
veillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1 (2012); Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other
Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614 (2011).
14 See ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 26–27, 39 (1987) (describ-
ing the open-ended nature of the language of the Amendments to the Constitution).
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rights philosophy.15 As individuals’ lives have become increasingly intertwined with
technology,16 constitutional harms have become increasingly hard to define. Thus,
individual rights, as articulated by the Bill of Rights, must be interpreted as interre-
lated in the National Surveillance State.17 The interrelationship of constitutional
amendments is critical as constitutional harms become entangled by mass surveil-
lance, including horizontal cybersurveillance.
The relationship between the First and Fourth Amendments, for example, is nec-
essary to recognize in such a system of governance.18 The First Amendment protects
expressive and associational rights.19 The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures.”20 The Fourth Amendment has been recognized as affording
“a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”21 Courts have recog-
nized that the two protections are linked—survival of First Amendment rights is
15 See Chester James Antieau, Natural Rights and the Founding Fathers—The Virginians,
17 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 43, 43, 46–49 (1960) (discussing how the Founding Fathers were
aware of natural rights, as evidenced through their writings); see also COX, supra note 14,
at 36, 38 (noting the influences on the Constitutional Convention).
16 See, e.g., VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVO-
LUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 11 (2013) (describing the
ways individuals use technology in their everyday lives).
17 Multiple scholars have started to look at the specific implications of the emerging
policing technologies that are the hallmarks of the National Surveillance State, such as the
chilling of expression, loss of agency and autonomy, and the mass conformity risks. See, e.g.,
NEIL  RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE
(2015); Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014); Julie
E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (2013); Deven R. Desai, Constitu-
tional Limits on Surveillance: Associational Freedom in the Age of Data Hoarding, 90 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 579 (2014); Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239
(2012); Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Whitnov, The Conforming Effect: First Amendment Im-
plications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465 (2015); Craig
Konnoth, An Expressive Theory of Privacy Intrusions, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1533 (2017); Neil M.
Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013); Scott Skinner-
Thompson, Performative Privacy, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1673 (2017); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Under a Watchful Eye: Incursions on Personal Privacy, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS:
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 128, 131 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr.
eds., 2003).
18 See Alex Abdo, Why Rely on the Fourth Amendment to Do the Work of the First?, 127
YALE L.J. F. 444 (2017); Nicole B. Cásarez, The Synergy of Privacy and Speech, 18 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 813 (2016).
19 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.”); see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 513 (1969); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
20 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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dependent upon the protections of the Fourth Amendment.22 The Fourth Amendment
“provide[s] citizens with the privacy protection necessary for secure enjoyment of
First Amendment liberties.”23
Thus, as technologies are developed to track and analyze sentiment and expres-
sion,24 it is essential to consider the potential effect of big data cybersurveillance on
the Constitution and the impact of near-constant, real-time surveillance on a democ-
racy.25 As part of the Symposium Big Data, National Security, and the Fourth Amend-
ment, this Essay preliminarily explores some constitutional challenges to the Fourth
Amendment that may result in light of emerging big data technologies that facilitate
horizontal cybersurveillance capacities. This Essay is descriptive in nature and, thus,
it does not aim to offer a legal analysis of the impact of horizontal cybersurveillance.
Rather, it offers a very brief overview of how national security policy is currently
embracing the phenomena of sentiment analysis as a technological outgrowth of
horizontal cybersurveillance.
This Essay proceeds in two parts. In Part I, this Essay describes how, increas-
ingly, the military and the intelligence communities rely upon “collect-it-all” programs
to enhance national security decision-making and counterterrorism policy. Part I fo-
cuses on how big data facilitates a synergistic and dependent relationship between
national security decision-making and developments in cybersurveillance. Part II
22 See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S.
496, 504 (1973); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313–14 (1972); Stanford
v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965); NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462 (“[There is a] vital relationship
between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations.”); Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of Press v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also Deirdre
K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective
on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1587 (2004).
23 Reporters Comm., 593 F.2d at 1054.
24 See infra Section I.C.
25 Development of these new technologies could lead to increasingly complex constitu-
tional issues in various areas, including algorithms, censorship, cyber hate, and the right to
be forgotten. See, e.g., DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014);
ABRAHAM H. FOXMAN & CHRISTOPHER WOLF, VIRAL HATE: CONTAINING ITS SPREAD ON
THE INTERNET (2013); Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445
(2013); Dawn Carla Nunziato, Forget About It? Harmonizing European and American Pro-
tections for Privacy, Free Speech, and Due Process, in PRIVACY AND POWER: A TRANS-
ATLANTIC DIALOGUE IN THE SHADOW OF THE NSA-AFFAIR (Russell A. Miller ed., 2017); Jeffrey
Rosen, The Deciders: Facebook, Google, and the Future of Privacy and Free Speech, in
CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 69 (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin
Wittes eds., 2011); Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88
(2012); Eric Posner, We All Have the Right to Be Forgotten, SLATE (May 14, 2014, 4:37 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2014/05/the_european
_right_to_be_forgotten_is_just_what_the_internet_needs.html [https://perma.cc/9H38-SLVB];
Jeffrey Rosen, The Delete Squad, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 29, 2013), https://newrepublic.com
/article/113045/free-speech-internet-silicon-valley-making-rules [https://perma.cc/HT5X-3PQ4].
366 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:361
explores how horizontal cybersurveillance makes possible what has been termed as
“sentiment analysis.” Sentiment analysis can be described as opinion mining and so-
cial movement forecasting. Through sentiment analysis, mass cybersurveillance
technologies can be deployed to detect potential terrorism and state conflict, predict
protest and civil unrest, and gauge the mood of populations and subpopulations.
The Essay concludes that horizontal cybersurveillance through sentiment analysis
has the likely result of chilling expressive and associational freedoms, while at the same
time risking mass data seizures and searches. These programs, therefore, must be as-
sessed as adversely impacting a combination of constitutional rights, such as simulta-
neously affecting both First and Fourth Amendment freedoms. The blending of
constitutional harms that results from new big data national security technologies must
be protected through an interpretive blending of multiple Bill of Rights protections.
I. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BIG DATA NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND
BIG DATA CYBERSURVEILLANCE
A. Overview of Big Data National Security Policy
Understanding big data cybersurveillance and big data governance26 requires
understanding big data. Although scholars have discussed its characteristics and com-
plexities, big data does not have a specific definition.27 Big data is often explained
in terms of “three Vs”—volume, velocity, and variety—although other experts add
other “Vs”: vision, verification, and valuation.28 Volume and variety refer to the
capabilities of big data analysis to absorb vast amounts of data from a multitude of
sources.29 For big data tools to work effectively, they require enormous amounts of
26 See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Biometric Surveillance and Big Data Governance, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE LAW 121 (David Gray & Stephen E. Henderson
eds., 2017).
27 See, e.g., JULES J. BERMAN, PRINCIPLES OF BIG DATA: PREPARING, SHARING, AND ANA-
LYZING COMPLEX INFORMATION xv–xvi (2013) (categorizing big data into the “three Vs”—
volume, velocity, and variety); MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 16, at 13
(describing big data as “messy, varie[d] in quality, and . . . distributed among countless
servers around the world”); see also The Big Data Conundrum: How to Define It?, MIT
TECH. REV. (Oct. 3, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/519851/the-big-data-conun
drum-how-to-define-it/ [https://perma.cc/JDR9-882J] [hereinafter Big Data Conundrum]
(listing the various definitions for “big data”).
28 See BERMAN, supra note 27, at xv. Regarding the veracity of the underlying data, it is
important to remember, as then-Judge Gorsuch explained it: “Garbage in, garbage out.”
United States v. Esquivel-Rios, 725 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 2013).
29 See Harry E. Pence, What Is Big Data and Why Is It Important?, 43 J. EDUC. TECH. SYS.
159, 161–62 (2014) (categorizing big data into the three Vs); Volume, Velocity, Variety: What
You Need to Know About Big Data, FORBES (Jan. 19, 2012, 9:46 AM), https://www.forbes.com
/sites/oreillymedia/2012/01/19/volume-velocity-variety-what-you-need-to-know-about-big-data
/2/#219a250470a1 [https://perma.cc/JD55-Q5U5] (categorizing big data into the three Vs).
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data.30 Big data is not defined solely by the amount of data—it is also about the
complexity of the data sets, and thus some argue that “the high degree of permuta-
tions and interactions within a data set . . . defines big data.”31 The three Vs require
“cost-effective, innovative forms of information processing” with the goal of achiev-
ing “enhanced insight and decision making.”32 As defined by the National Science
Foundation, “Big Data Science & Engineering” is about using information analysis
and supervision to obtain information from “large, diverse, distributed and heteroge-
neous data sets.”33 Big data science permits the creation of data infrastructure as well
as new algorithmic and analytic data tools.34 Big data technologies are necessarily
outside human capacity because big data requires supercomputing and machine
learning—accordingly, humans require computer assistance, such as algorithms, to
process the data.35 To understand the shift in governance from a small data36 surveil-
lance37 world to a big data38 cybersurveillance39 world, it is helpful to understand the
distinctions between small data surveillance (vertical surveillance) and big data
30 See Uthayasankar Sivarajah et al., Critical Analysis of Big Data Challenges and Ana-
lytical Methods, 70 J. BUS. RES. 263, 265 (2017).
31 See Big Data Conundrum, supra note 27.
32 John Pavolotsky, Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 69 BUS. LAW. 217, 217 (2013)
(quoting Svetlana Sicular, Gartner’s Big Data Definition Consists of Three Parts, Not to Be
Confused with Three “V”s, FORBES (Mar. 27, 2013, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/gartnergroup/2013/03/27/gartners-big-data-definition-consists-of-three-parts-not-to-be
-confused-with-three-vs/#7bcebc4b42f6 [https://perma.cc/2E4C-T4DW]).
33 NAT’L SCI. FOUND., NSF 12-499, CORE TECHNIQUES AND TECHNOLOGIES FOR AD-
VANCING BIG DATA SCIENCE & ENGINEERING (BIGDATA) 2 (2012), https://www.nsf.gov
/pubs/2012/nsf12499/nsf12499.pdf [http://perma.cc/LU47-K366].
34 See id.
35 See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 16, at 11–12.
36 “Small data” has been described, generally, “as solving discrete questions with limited
and structured data, and the data are generally controlled by one institution.” Andrew Guthrie
Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 329 n.6
(2015) (citing BERMAN, supra note 27, at 1–2). For a list of important recent works detailing
the legal and privacy implications of transformative technological developments like the
Internet and technological innovations in surveillance capacities, see Margaret Hu, Small
Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 773, 776 n.2 (2015).
37 In an earlier article, I used “the term [‘small data surveillance’] . . . as a way to mark a
contrast between traditional intelligence gathering methods (i.e., ‘small data surveillance’)
and newly emerging intelligence methods that are digital data-driven, dependent upon super-
computing capacities, and capitalize on big data phenomena and tolls (i.e., ‘big data surveil-
lance’).” Hu, supra note 36, at 776 n.3. I adopt the same definition here.
38 Multiple authors have addressed the characteristics of “big data” and the challenges
posed by big data technologies. See generally, e.g., BIG DATA CHALLENGES, supra note 1;
KALYVAS & OVERLY, supra note 1; PRIVACY SOLUTIONS, supra note 1.
39 For a list of scholarship that “use[s] the term ‘big data surveillance’ to describe how
surveillance methods are evolving in light of the emerging pervasiveness of big data tech-
nologies,” see Hu, supra note 36, at 778 n.8.
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surveillance (horizontal cybersurveillance and indiscriminate bulk collection of
data).40 Vertical surveillance begins with suspicion, often of a specific target, which
leads to monitoring, surveillance, and search warrants.41 Vertical collection is purpose-
driven: it is about building an investigatory case to confirm or eliminate the suspi-
cion that triggered the monitoring.42 Horizontal data collection is radically different
in scope and kind from vertical data collection. Horizontal data collection is often
initiated without a specific target.43 It is suspicionless cybersurveillance, which
collects and digitally stores data for real-time or future analysis.44 “Bulk” data col-
lection, such as bulk “telephone metadata” collection, is one illustrative method of
horizontal data collection.45 Some analysts and scholars describe horizontal mass
collection as a “‘haystack-before-the-needle’ approach.”46 Horizontal data collection
methods emphasize collecting as much data as possible to connect the dots for
meaningful connections or associations.47
In horizontal cybersurveillance, the goal is to collect as much data as possible
for subsequent analysis.48 Rob Kitchin explains that data-driven science is “more open
to using a hybrid combination of abductive, inductive and deductive approaches to
advance the understanding of a phenomenon.”49 Big data seeks correlation that can
potentially provide predictive results.50 In a national security context, big data may
be utilized to predict crimes or terrorist attacks before they occur.51 The ability to
collect nearly unlimited amounts of data enables algorithms that may identify patterns
40 See Hu, supra note 36, at 776 nn.2–3, 777 n.4 (discussing the importance of realizing
the small and big data surveillance distinctions).
41 Id. at 804, 832.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 832–33.
44 Id.
45 See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Cus-
tomers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013, 6:05 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/world
/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order [https://perma.cc/3RSS-D6SK].
46 Stephen I. Vladeck, Big Data Before and After Snowden, 7 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y
333, 334 (2014) (citing Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Opinion, The Double Danger of the
NSA’s ‘Collect It All’ Policy on Surveillance, GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2013, 10:19 EDT), http://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/10/double-danger-nsa-surveillance [https://
perma.cc/5DFN-FDTM]).
47 See Hu, supra note 36, at 834–35.
48 See id. at 802–05.
49 Rob Kitchin, Big Data, New Epistemologies and Paradigm Shifts, 1 BIG DATA &
SOC’Y 1, 5 (2014).
50 See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015) ; Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale,
The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014). 
51 See William C. Banks, Next Generation Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law:
Renewing 702, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 671 (2017).
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and, potentially, crime or terrorism.52 The differences between vertical and horizon-
tal collection methods, as well as the predictive potential of big data, provide insight
into why intelligence communities have implemented and focused on “collect-it-all”
programs,53 as was revealed by the disclosures provided by former National Security
Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden.54 The Snowden revelation demon-
strated mass, indiscriminate bulk data collection from individuals without suspicion.55
One of Snowden’s disclosures contained an NSA slide that described the “collection
posture” of the NSA: “‘Collect it All,’ ‘Process it All,’ ‘Exploit it All,’ ‘Partner it All,’
‘Sniff it All,’ and, ultimately, ‘Know it All.’”56 Because big data analysis is capable of
making broad connections, it motivates increasing data collection—the value of one
piece of information is often unknown until it is connected to information that has
already been obtained, or that might be obtained in the future.57
B. Overview of Horizontal Cybersurveillance
Because of the change in technological capacity with the rise of the Information
Society, the vocabulary surrounding surveillance itself has changed. Data surveillance,
described as “dataveillance,”58 refers to monitoring or investigation of individual
52 See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment,
89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 42–46 (2014) (describing how police departments in the United States
can use data to predict criminal activity).
53 See Mathew Ingram, Even the CIA Is Struggling to Deal with the Volume of Real-Time
Social Data, GIGAOM (Mar. 20, 2013, 10:27 AM), https://gigaom.com/2013/03/20/even-the
-cia-is-struggling-to-deal-with-the-volume-of-real-time-social-data [https://perma.cc/DG54
-DLXY] [hereinafter CIA Presentation] (providing video from and a transcript of the CIA’s
Chief Technology Officer’s speech at Gigaom’s March 2013 conference).
54 See Margaret Hu, Taxonomy of the Snowden Disclosures, 72 WASH & LEE L. REV.
1679, 1689–94 (2015). See generally GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD
SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE (2014); THE SNOWDEN READER
(David. P. Fidler ed., 2015).
55 See generally AFTER SNOWDEN: PRIVACY, SECRECY, AND SECURITY IN THE IN-
FORMATION AGE (Ronald Goldfarb ed., 2015); DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN
AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE (2017).
56 David Cole, Opinion, ‘No Place to Hide’ by Glenn Greenwald, on the NSA’s Sweeping
Efforts to ‘Know It All,’ WASH. POST (May 12, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/opinions/no-place-to-hide-by-glenn-greenwald-on-the-nsas-sweeping-efforts-to-know-it
-all/2014/05/12/dfa45dee-d628-11e3-8a78-8fe50322a72c_story.html?=utm_term=.3bbb86d
72687 [https://perma.cc/P59V-E297].
57 RACHEL LEVINSON-WALDMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT THE GOVERNMENT
DOES WITH AMERICANS’ DATA 17 (2013).
58 Roger Clarke is generally credited with introducing the term “dataveillance” into aca-
demic discourse. See Roger A. Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, 31 COMM.
ACM 498, 498–99 (1988); see also MARTIN KUHN, FEDERAL DATAVEILLANCE: IMPLICATIONS
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actions, activities, or communications through the use of information technology.59
The complete capacities and potential consequences of this “new surveillance” are
as yet not fully known.60 What is understood is that mass dataveillance and cybersur-
veillance is possible because technology now exists that “datafie[s]”61 virtually all
information. Thus, social life, human activity, and knowledge can be quantified, digi-
tized, retained indefinitely, and analyzed for connections and information.62 The
Snowden disclosures demonstrate why, in constitutional analysis, it is important to
understand the differences between small data surveillance and big data cybersur-
veillance.63 The Snowden disclosures and other revelations provided evidence of the
extent to which the NSA and other agencies are increasingly using mass dataveillance
and cybersurveillance tools,64 in addition to traditional surveillance methods devel-
oped in a small data world.
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 1–3 (2007) (examining constitutional impli-
cations of “knowledge discovery in databases” (KDD applications) through dataveillance);
DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 16 (2007) (“Being much cheaper than
direct physical or electronic surveillance [dataveillance] enables the watching of more people
or populations, because economic constraints to surveillance are reduced. Dataveillance also
automates surveillance. Classically, government bureaucracies have been most interested in
gathering such data . . . .”).
59 See Clarke, supra note 58, at 499 (describing dataveillance as “the systematic use of
personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications of
one or more persons”).
60 See LYON, supra note 58, at 87–89.
61 MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 16, at 91–97.
62 CIA Presentation, supra note 53. See generally JAMES GLEICK, THE INFORMATION: A
HISTORY, A THEORY, A FLOOD (2011); DOUGLAS RUSHKOFF, PRESENT SHOCK: WHEN EVERY-
THING HAPPENS NOW (2013).
63 See generally Hu, supra note 36.
64 The Snowden disclosures have included multiple high-profile revelations on newly
emerging dataveillance tools, cybersurveillance methods, and information specific to their
implementation. See Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data
from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-in
ternet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb
04497_story.html [https://perma.cc/6FZ3-XR6T]; Greenwald, supra note 45; Ellen Nakashima
& Barton Gellman, Court Gave NSA Broad Leeway in Surveillance, Documents Show,
WASH. POST (June 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/court
-gave-nsa-broad-leeway-in-surveillance-documents-show/2014/06/30/32b872ec-fae4-11e3
-8176-f2c941cf35f1_story.html [https://perma.cc/475T-LQDD]; Scott Shane, No Morsel Too
Minuscule for All-Consuming N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes
.com/2013/11/03/world/no-morsel-too-minuscule-for-all-consuming-nsa.html; T.C. Sottek
& Janus Kopfstein, Everything You Need to Know About PRISM: A Cheat Sheet for the
NSA’s Unprecedented Surveillance Programs, VERGE (July 17, 2013), http://www.theverge
.com/2013/7/17/4517480/nsa-spying-prism-surveillance-cheat-sheet [https://perma.cc
/SXR6-VP5D].
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In intelligence settings, cybersurveillance “collect-it-all”65 tools can potentially
create “digital avatars”66—virtual representations67 of digital selves.68 “Data self”69
and “cyber self”70 are used to describe an individual’s online reputation. “Digital per-
sonhood,”71 as described by scholars, means something entirely different. It describes
the process by which “digital dossiers”72 may be created to construct what has been
variously described by scholars as a “data-double,”73 “data image,”74 “digital per-
sona,”75 or “electronic personality and digital self.”76 These terms are used to explain
that in the Information Society, cybersurveillance is not aimed at “complete bodies,”
but rather in “fragments of data”77 that can create a bigger and more complete picture
of many individuals and their connections. Another related concept, the “prolifera-
tion of networked identities and selves,” refers to preservation of the autonomous
individual within the Information Society’s vast infrastructure.78
65 See Cole, supra note 56 (“In one remarkable [NSA] slide presented at a 2011 meeting
of five nations’ intelligence agencies and revealed here for the first time, the NSA described
its ‘collection posture’ as ‘Collect it All,’ ‘Process it All,’ ‘Exploit it All,’ ‘Partner it All,’
‘Sniff it All’ and, ultimately, ‘Know it All.’”).
66 “The term ‘digital avatar’ is used often in the video gaming context, and most
commonly refers to a digitally constructed representation of the computing user or, in some
instance, the representation of the user’s alter ego or character.” Hu, supra note 36, at 779
n.11 (citing Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2012)). “In Hart v. Electronic Arts,
Inc., for example, a class action suit of college athletes alleged that their digital avatars and
likeness had been unlawfully appropriated for profit by the video game developer, Electronic
Arts, Inc.” Id. (citing Hart, 717 F.3d 141).
67 Virtual reality and augmented reality give rise to legal questions that span multiple
legal disciplines. See David E. Fink & Jamie N. Zagoria, VR/AR in a Real World, 33 ENT.
& SPORTS LAW. 1, 75–79 (2016); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Law, Virtual Reality,
and Augmented Reality, 166 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
68 See DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF (Yasmine Abbas & Fred Dervin eds., 2009).
69 See Robert Gordon, The Electronic Personality and Digital Self, 56 DISP. RESOL. J. 8,
14 (2001) (stating how the “digital self” allows one to “become whomever [one] want[s] to
be in cyberspace” (emphasis removed)).
70 See Chassitty N. Whitman & William H. Gottdiener, The Cyber Self: Facebook as a
Predictor of Well-Being, 13 INT’L J. APPLIED PSYCHOANALYTIC STUD. 142 (2016).
71 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE (2004).
72 See id. at 1–2; Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (2002).
73 Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51 BRIT. J.
SOC. 605, 606, 611, 613, 616 (2000).
74 LYON, supra note 58, at 87 (citing DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE OF
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 19 (1994)).
75 See id. at 87–88 (citing Roger Clarke, The Digital Persona and Its Application to Data
Surveillance, 10 INFO. SOC’Y 77 (1994)).
76 See Gordon, supra note 69, at 14.
77 See LYON, supra note 58, at 88 (citing Haggerty & Ericson, supra note 73, at 612).
78 For scholarship on this concept, see Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L.
REV. 1735, 1754 & n.71 (2015).
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One alleged 2010 NSA document from the Snowden materials explained the pos-
sible function of digital selves: “‘It’s not just the traditional communications we’re
after: It’s taking a full-arsenal approach that digitally exploits the clues a target leaves
behind in their regular activities on the net to compile biographic and biometric
information’ that can help ‘implement precision targeting.’”79 Other information in the
Snowden disclosures included discussions of biometric data collection80—finger-
prints, irises, DNA, and facial recognition technology applied to digital photographs.81
The “full-arsenal approach” of mass surveillance relies on data science82 to pinpoint
suspicious data and evidence of guilt in digital avatars.83 These tools are heighted by
the use of other cybersurveillance techniques, including sentiment analysis.84
C. Horizontal Cybersurveillance Through Sentiment Analysis: Future Trajectory
of Big Data National Security Policy
The development of social media, as well as the proliferation of online media
and big data tools, has led to technologies that are capable of tracking and identify-
ing sentiment in societies and communities.85 These tools are valuable in precrime
ambitions.86 After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, policy began focusing
on “precrime” decision-making, rather than prevention.87 The capacities of big data
79 Risen & Poitras, supra note 5, at A1.
80 Id. “While once focused on written and oral communications, the N.S.A. now considers
facial images, fingerprints and other identifiers just as important to its mission of tracking
suspected terrorists and other intelligence targets, the documents show.” Id.
81 Biometrics is “[t]he science of automatic identification or identity verification of
individuals using physiological or behavioral characteristics.” JOHN R. VACCA, BIOMETRIC
TECHNOLOGIES AND VERIFICATION SYSTEMS 589 (2007). For a list of sources exploring the
emerging technology of biometrics and discussing its application and potential consequences,
see Hu, supra note 36, at 781 n.18.
82 “At its core, data science involves using automated methods to analyze massive amounts
of data and to extract knowledge from them.” What Is Data Science?, N.Y.U., https://datasci
ence.nyu.edu/what-is-data-science/ [https://perma.cc/M7ET-NF8L] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
83 For a careful examination of the legal implications of utilizing targeted killing policies
and drone strikes as a crucial element of the United States’ counterterrorism policy, see Hu,
supra note 36, at 784 n.27 (citing multiple scholars, including Martin S. Flaherty, Oren Gross,
Gregory S. McNeal, Matthew Craig, and Jennifer Daskal, who have thoroughly studied this
subject area).
84 See Walaa Medhat et al., Sentiment Analysis Algorithms and Applications: A Survey,
5 AIN SHAMS ENGINEERING J. 1093 (2014) (Egypt) (providing a detailed overview of
sentiment analysis techniques).
85 See id. at 1093; Ronen Feldman, Techniques and Applications for Sentiment Analysis,
56 COMM. ACM 82, 83–84 (2013) (describing how sentiment analysis works).
86 See Hu, supra note 26, at 122 (stating that “Minority Report–type biometric surveillance
systems and precrime rationales are now embedded in big data governance ambitions”).
87 Id. at 123.
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make predictive analysis possible, thus incentivizing precrime governance programs
and increasing the use of mass cybersurveillance technologies.88
Sentiment analysis purports to be a valuable tool in a precrime policing model.
Sentiment analysis, also described as “opinion mining,” is described as “the compu-
tational study of people’s opinions, attitudes, and emotions toward an entity.”89 It can
“analyze what a percentage of the population ‘feels’ about something, often by mea-
suring the sentiments embedded in social media posts or by asking a community
directly to share its feelings, thoughts, or opinions in a machine-readable way.”90 Other
tools related to sentiment analysis include geofencing programs that collect public
social media postings or track users’ locations for commercial or ideological pur-
poses.91 Geofencing creates a “virtual fence” around an identified physical location.92
This technology, when paired with social media, could permit sentiment analysis of
a given location, as well as tracking and cybersurveillance of activities in the area
based on social media activity.93 Such tools raise understandable concerns about the
problems of individual tracking and the potential for privacy violations, as well as
interference with constitutionally protected activities.94
Programs intended to track and analyze population sentiment were in existence
long before big data and were utilized in national security and military contexts.
During World War II, social scientists tried “to predict national [behavior] as part of
wartime operations.”95 These studies were intended to “enable American political
88 See generally id.
89 Medhat et al., supra note 84, at 1093.
90 Sam Petulla, Feelings, Nothing More than Feelings: The Measured Rise of Sentiment
Analysis in Journalism, NIEMAN LAB (Jan. 23, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.niemanlab.org
/2013/01/feelings-nothing-more-than-feelings-the-measured-rise-of-sentiment-analysis-in
-journalism/ [https://perma.cc/EAU4-TQJN].
91 See generally Jonah Engel Bromwich et al., Police Use Surveillance Tool to Scan
Social Media, A.C.L.U. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016
/10/12/technology/aclu-facebook-twitter-instagram-geofeedia.html; Matthew Cagle, Facebook,
Instagram, and Twitter Provided Data Access for a Surveillance Product Marketed to Target
Activists of Color, ACLU (Oct. 11, 2016, 11:15 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy
-technology/internet-privacy/facebook-instagram-and-twitter-provided-data-access
[https://perma.cc/B8H7-Z8LV]; Nicole Ozer, Police Use of Social Media Surveillance
Software Is Escalating, and Activists Are in the Digital Crosshairs, ACLU (Sept. 22, 2016,
2:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/police
-use-social-media-surveillance-software [https://perma.cc/T6KM-ZBWM].
92 Jamie Wong et al., An Android Geofencing App for Autonomous Remote Switch Control,
11 INT’L J. COMPUTER & INFO. ENGINEERING 325, 325 (2017).
93 See Bromwich et al., supra note 91; Cagle, supra note 91; Ally Marotti, Chicago Police
Used Geofeedia, the TweetDeck for Cops Under Fire from ACLU, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 13, 2016,
2:30 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/originals/ct-geofeedia-police-surveil
lance-reports-bsi-20161013-story.html; Ozer, supra note 91.
94 See Ozer, supra note 91.
95 Mark Solovey, Project Camelot and the 1960s Epistemological Revolution: Rethinking
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leaders to control beliefs and attitudes within target populations, both domestic and
foreign.”96 Much of this research appeared to be targeted towards controlling commu-
nist influences in particular regions of the world.97 Such military research demon-
strated “a marked preference for quantitative analysis.”98
In the 1960s, the U.S. military sponsored a study of revolutionary processes
called “Project Camelot.”99 Camelot was a project of the Department of Defense, the
Defense Science Board, and the U.S. Army; it was planned by the Special Operations
Research Office (SORO).100 Project Camelot’s objectives were to (1) “devise pro-
cedures for assessing the potential for internal war within societies,” (2) “identify
with increased degrees of confidence those actions which a government might take to
relieve conditions which are assessed as giving rise to a potential for internal war,” and
(3) “assess the feasibility of prescribing the characteristics of a system for obtaining
and using the essential information needed for doing the above two things.”101 Essen-
tially, Project Camelot attempted to engage in sentiment analysis regarding internal
wars, determine how to reduce the tensions in a population, and discern how to make
a system that would provide the information needed. Project Camelot was disbanded
after rising international and political tensions,102 but the notion of being able to predict
possible crises has never disappeared; it has only increased following September 11.103
II. SOCIAL RADAR CASE STUDY: THE FUTURE OF
BIG DATA NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
In 2010, the Air Force published a paper104 that it described as a “vision document”
for a tool it referred to as “Social Radar.”105 It was inspired by the use of traditional mil-
itary radar and other detection tools as a means to expand “situational awareness” by
the Politics-Patronage-Social Science Nexus, 31 SOC. STUD. SCI. 171, 177 (2001), http://jour
nals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0306312701031002003 [https://perma.cc/9F55-LWXL].
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 180.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 180–81 (internal quotations omitted).
102 Id. at 186 (“Within the United States, international outcry from abroad triggered a
series of communications involving the US ambassador to Chile, the State Department, the
military, and the White House, leading in July of 1965 to Camelot’s cancellation.”).
103 See Steve Ressler, Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat Terrorism:
Past, Present, and Future Research, 2 HOMELAND SECURITY AFF. 1, 3 (2006), https://www
.hsaj.org/articles/171 [https://www.perma.cc/QQG8-YJ9U].
104 The document was authored by Dr. Mark Maybury, then chief scientist of the U.S. Air
Force. Dr. Mark T. Maybury: Vice President, Intelligence Portfolios, MITRE National Security
Sector, MITRE CORP., https://www.mitre.org/about/leadership/executive/dr-mark-t-maybury
[https://perma.cc/PF8E-VRNV] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
105 MARK MAYBURY, MITRE CORP., SOCIAL RADAR FOR SMART POWER 1 (2010), https://
www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/10_0745.pdf [https://perma.cc/KYP4-2LL6].
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enhancing ordinary human capabilities, such as sight.106 The document explained that
these tools, however, “are blind to human adversary attitudes and intentions and often
even behaviors toward our messages and activities.”107 It further explained that while
military technology is important, “soft power”—the ability “to encourage or moti-
vate behavior”—is highly significant in an increasingly globally connected world.108
A. Brief History of Horizontal Cybersurveillance Programs
The development of big-data horizontal scanning programs facilitated mass cyber-
surveillance and big data governance, particularly in the wake of the September 11
attacks.109 For example, a post-9/11 program, Total Information Awareness (TIA),
later renamed Terrorism Information Awareness,110 was a “collect it all” surveillance
program.111 TIA was a project of the Information Awareness Office, within the Depart-
ment of Defense’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).112 TIA
had preventive policing ambitions and endorsed mass data collection to assess and
prevent future threats.113 TIA was intended to “integrate advanced collaborative and
decision support tools; language translation; and data search, pattern recognition,
and privacy protection technologies into an experimental prototype network focused
on the problems of countering terrorism through better analysis”114 and decision-
making. This program acknowledged human limitations—given the sheer amount
of information available for analysis—and instead sought “a much more systematic
methodological approach that automates many of the lower level functions that can
106 Id. at 2.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 3.
109 See generally Hu, supra note 78.
110 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST TERRORISM: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROGRAM ASSESSMENT 239 (2008).
111 TIA was not referred to as a “Collect It All” program at the time of its conception. See
id. at 239–49. Rather, this phrase is taken from the Snowden disclosures. See GREENWALD,
supra note 54, at 97 (citing NSA slide from Snowden disclosures titled, “New Collection
Posture” and quoting NSA data collection procedure as “Collect it All”).
112 See Nancy Murray, Profiling in the Age of Total Information Awareness, 52 RACE &
CLASS 3, 6 (2010).
113 DEF. ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS REGARDING
THE TERRORISM INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAM: IN RESPONSE TO CONSOLIDATED
APPROPRIATIONS RESOLUTION, 2003, PUB. L. NO. 108-7, DIVISION M, § 111(B), at A-1
(2003), https://epic.org/privacy/profiling/tia/may03_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/X52X-3D4B]
[hereinafter DARPA REPORT] (“[T]his program . . . would provide decision- and policy-
makers with information and knowledge about terrorist planning and preparation activities
that would aid in preventing future international terrorist attacks against the United States at
home and abroad.”); see also Matt Kessler, The Logo that Took Down a DARPA Surveillance
Project, ATLANTIC (Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015
/12/darpa-logos-information-awareness-office/421635/ [https://perma.cc/T6CX-Y4NM].
114 See DARPA REPORT, supra note 113, at A-1.
376 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:361
be done by machines guided by the human users.”115 TIA, in short, intended to harness
the power of big data and algorithms to provide greater efficiency in intelligence and
analysis.116 TIA was officially defunded in late 2003,117 but experts theorized that the
remnants of TIA survived in the NSA, ultimately leading to the types of programs
that Edward Snowden revealed in 2013.118
Following the Snowden disclosures, bulk data collection became a matter of
increasing public concern.119 The existence of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA)120 and the PATRIOT Act121 were not secrets—they operated pursuant to
existing law. Even prior to the Snowden disclosures, people were already expressing
concerns about the way in which surveillance had been conducted.122
In 2008, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) created the “Minerva Research
Initiative,”123 with the intent, in partnership with universities, “to improve DoD’s
basic understanding of the social, cultural, behavioral, and political forces that shape
regions of the world of strategic importance to the [U.S.]”124 Minerva engages in broad
avenues of “research aimed at improving our basic understanding of security, broadly
defined.”125 One Minerva project is a study managed by the U.S. Air Force Office of
Scientific Research that “aims to develop an empirical model ‘of the dynamics of
social movement mobilization and contagions.’”126 Aspects of the project include
examining recent crises, such as the Arab Spring and protests in Turkey, through
“digital traces” on social media.127 Tracking and analyzing sentiment and how social
movements occur is an aspect of sentiment analysis technologies that may provide
avenues with which to develop more detailed cybersurveillance of potential threats
identified by the national security and intelligence communities.128
115 Id. at A-2.
116 Id. at A-5.
117 Kessler, supra note 113.
118 See Hu, supra note 26, at 138–39.
119 See, e.g., Gellman & Poitras, supra note 64 (describing one such instance).
120 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c (2012)).
121 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
122 See, e.g., Ron Wyden, Floor Statement on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA)—June 25, 2008, YOUTUBE (Jan. 15, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bgn
O0s32Lvc.
123 See Nafeez Ahmed, Pentagon Preparing for Mass Civil Breakdown, GUARDIAN
(June 12, 2014, 2:00 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2014
/jun/12/pentagon-mass-civil-breakdown [https://perma.cc/3PCC-79JX].
124 Id.
125 MINERVA RES. INITIATIVE, http://minerva.defense.gov/ [https://perma.cc/F7AN-TLRS]
(last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
126 Ahmed, supra note 123.
127 Id.
128 See id.
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Horizontal scaling and sentiment analysis programs appear in other branches of
military research. The Office of Naval Research: Science and Technology (ONR)
operates a program called the Human Social Cultural Behavioral Sciences Program
(HSCB).129 According to the ONR, HSCB “is a technology investment area that strives
to support decision making and improve tactical warfighter training and mission
rehearsal by developing cross-cultural and sociocultural skills, computational social
science models and simulations.”130 The goals of the HSCB is to provide the Navy
and Marine Corps with the ability “to identify, anticipate and defeat adaptive irregular
threats operating within the physical, cyber and sociocultural domains.”131 Within
the context of the DoD, the HSCB program has been described as a tool to serve
intelligence ends.132 According to the DoD, it is intended to provide the military
“with the knowledge and tools to understand the dynamics of regional populations
through the development of data collection and analysis methods, computational
social science models and sociocultural training methods and tools.”133 HSCB, like
other horizontal scanning programs, relies on big data “to develop, implement, and
demonstrate forecasting and predictive models of human behavior for both analytic
application and warfighter training.”134
In addition to domestic horizontal scanning and cybersurveillance, the United
States’ cybersurveillance technology and philosophies have been exported. Singa-
pore appears to have adopted a TIA-like program in the form of its Risk Assessment
and Horizon Scanning (RAHS) program.135 One of the consultants to RAHS, retired
Navy Vice Admiral and former National Security Advisor John M. Poindexter, led
TIA during its brief existence.136 In an article for Foreign Policy detailing RAHS,
Shane Harris explains that “Singapore is testing whether mass surveillance and big
data can not only protect national security, but actually engineer a more harmonious
society.”137 RAHS is a national defense program rooted in cybersurveillance tools.138
Because RAHS appears to be TIA-inspired, and uses big data to strengthen national
defense, it is unsurprising that the U.S. intelligence community has taken notice of
129 Human Social Cultural Behavioral Sciences, OFF. NAVAL RES. (Oct. 2012), https://
www.onr.navy.mil/en/Media-Center/Fact-Sheets/Human-Social-Cultural-Behavior
[https://perma.cc/4YRA-7FM7].
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 See id.
133 Id.
134 Human, Social, Culture, & Behavior (HSCB) Modeling, PAC. SCI. & ENGINEERING
GROUP, http://www.pacific-science.com/ad7/sites/default/files/HSCB%20Project%20Sum
mary_13Mar12_0pdf [https://perma.cc/DB69-QMQV] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
135 Shane Harris, The Social Laboratory, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 29, 2014), http://www
.foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/29/the-social-laboratory/ [https://perma.cc/J644-D6CV].
136 Id. (“After Poindexter left DARPA in 2003, he became a consultant to RAHS, and many
American spooks have traveled to Singapore to study the program firsthand.”).
137 Id.
138 See id.
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the Singapore model.139 RAHS demonstrates a troubling future for big data cyber-
surveillance as more than just a tool of national security. RAHS appears to trace the
path of the National Surveillance State: an administrative state that increasingly
facilitates bureaucratized cybersurveillance.140 RAHS’s horizontal scanning capabili-
ties are used for a multitude of functions: budgeting, economics, policymaking, and
education plans, as well as broad sentiment analysis of the population.141
Horizontal cybersurveillance programs such as Social Radar, TIA, and RAHS
signal how the National Surveillance State may be in the process of transforming into
a National Cybersurveillance State. Horizontal scanning and geofencing tools have
been utilized by U.S. law enforcement agencies,142 and the long-term impact of such
cybersurveillance, as well as its constitutional implications, are as yet unknown.
B. Basic Mechanics of Social Radar
Social Radar aims to engage in sentiment analysis, as well as to provide geo-
graphic and social tracking. Thus, Social Radar would permit a more active and
targeted engagement with the population under analysis.143 It would rely on data “to
sense, if not forecast, a broad spectrum of phenomena (e.g., political, economic, social,
environmental, health) and potentially forecast changing trends in population per-
ceptions and behaviors.”144 Social Radar also was intended to provide a way to de-
termine how individuals within the population would interact.145 Such a tool would
also be useful in counterinsurgency operations to track sentiment in the population
and to determine the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of such actions.146
Social Radar appears to necessarily implicate big data tools: global, real-time
data acquisition; capacity to process multiple forms of media; comprehending,
recognizing, and understanding speech, images and video; automated and continu-
ous communication analysis; geolocational analyses of social media platforms; and
capacity to identify and track individual or group connections.147 Social Radar would
139 See id. (“[M]any current and former U.S. officials have come to see Singapore as a
model for how they’d build an intelligence apparatus if privacy laws and a long tradition of
civil liberties weren’t standing in the way.”).
140 See id.
141 Id.; see also Hu, supra note 26, at 144–45 (detailing RAHS and what the program is
capable of).
142 See supra notes 85–94 and accompanying text.
143 See MAYBURY, supra note 105, at 3 (“Social Radar needs to sense perceptions, atti-
tudes, beliefs and behaviors . . . and geographically and/or socially localize and track these
to support the smart engagement of foreign populations and the assessment and replanning
of efforts based on indicator progression.”).
144 Id.
145 Id. (“[A] social radar should enable us to forecast who will cluster with whom in a
network, where, and when in what kinds of relationships.”).
146 See id. at 6–7.
147 See id. at 4–5.
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appear to operate as a suspicionless form of surveillance—it would use “sources and
methods that do not require active polling or engagement,” and it would utilize
anonymous collection methods to “help[ ] mitigate bias that is inevitable when the
person/population is aware of the data collection.”148 The “architecture”149 behind
Social Radar includes the potential sources of information, such as military, legal,
political, economic, social, health, and environmental data. Uses for Social Radar
include: communication, counterinsurgency, and humanitarian methods.150
C. Current Status of Social Radar and Social Radar-Type Programs
Social Radar is under development by MITRE.151 Another MITRE paper, pub-
lished in 2012, explains that Social Radar would be useful “to understand, track,
anticipate the effects of, or react effectively to the kinds of communication that feed
large scale uprisings, or to understand and exploit the relationship between non-kinetic
messaging and nation-state stability.”152 This paper noted the relationship between
social media use and civil unrest in the Arab Spring, and pointed out that the communi-
cations on social media “play a very important part in building the networks that
enable violent extremism, developing the strategies, tactics, and actions of violent
extremist organizations, and determining the impact they have on adversaries and
general populations.”153 Effective “[S]ocial [R]adar depends on continuous access
to global data on general population perceptions, attitudes, opinions, sentiments, and
behaviors.”154 The 2012 paper poses a number of questions that are essential to reach
the ideal goals of Social Radar, including using mobile devices and crowd sourcing
to “collect and process relevant social media and Internet data,” and processing and
analyzing data “at a global scale.”155 Sentiment analysis in Social Radar would need
to include the ability to quickly determine public opinion, whether social media
could be predictive, and determine how ideas, messages, and sentiment spread.156
148 Id. at 4.
149 Id. at 6–7. Experts increasingly describe dataveillance, big data surveillance, and cyber-
surveillance in architectural terms. See, e.g., BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE
HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 48 (2015) (“This
[digital data collection and analysis] has evolved into a shockingly extensive, robust, and
profitable surveillance architecture.”); see also JENNIFER STISA GRANICK, AMERICAN SPIES:
MODERN SURVEILLANCE, WHY YOU SHOULD CARE, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2017);
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN ANXIOUS
AGE (2004); Hu, supra note 54, at 1687, 1690, 1705.
150 MAYBURY, supra note 105, at 7.
151 Id. at 9.
152 BARRY COSTA & JOHN BOINEY, MITRE CORP., SOCIAL RADAR 3-1–3-2 (2012),
https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/12_0581.pdf [https://perma.cc/CR2V-JHHN].
153 Id. at 3-2.
154 Id. at 3-5.
155 Id. at 3-6.
156 See id. at 3-9–3-10.
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Another paper, Social Radar Workflows, Dashboards, and Environments,157 de-
ploys Social Radar to analyze, using Twitter access,158 the 2011 United Kingdom
riots and election protests.159 Per the paper, Social Radar search tools include “Global
Instability Hotspotting,” “Sentiment Analysis,” “Sensitive Instability Detectors and
Emotion Analyses for Twitter,” “Emotion Graphing,” “Comment Filtering,” “Topic
Clouds,” and “Course of Action Models.”160 According to this document, “[a] sig-
nificant portion of the Social Radar data falls into the big data category, as it is
composed of billions of small text messages.”161 The authors also note the potential
uses for Social Radar in stability operations outside the United States,162 counter-
insurgency,163 peacekeeping operations,164 foreign internal defense,165 foreign humani-
tarian assistance,166 and combatting weapons of mass destruction.167
MITRE currently offers Social Radar Technologies for licensing.168 According
to MITRE, Social Radar “allow[s] analysts to detect, track, and understand social
change in information-dense environments faster than humans alone are typically
able.”169 Social Radar tools can process sources of information, such as news, tweets,
and blogs for sentiment analysis, identifying influence developing “short-term fore-
casts, and support[ing] option analysis and decision making.”170 MITRE also claims
157 JENNIFER MATHIEU ET AL., MITRE CORP., SOCIAL RADAR WORKFLOWS, DASH-
BOARDS, AND ENVIRONMENTS (2012), https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/12_0567
.pdf [https://perma.cc/9B63-UP2S].
158 Id. at 25-3.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 25-4–25-6.
161 Id. at 25-14. The authors of this paper do not explain what they mean by the term “text
messages.”
162 “Stability Operations occur outside of the US in coordination with other ‘national powers
to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment and to provide essential government
services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.’” Id. at 25-20.
163 “Counterinsurgency encompasses comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken
to defeat an insurgency and address core grievances.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
164 “A [p]eace [o]peration contains conflict, redresses the peace, and shapes the envi-
ronment to support reconciliation and rebuilding, and facilitates the transition to legitimate
governance.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
165 “Foreign Internal Defense participates with civilian agencies in action taken by another
government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency,
terrorism, and other threats to its security . . . .” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
166 “Foreign Humanitarian Assistance occurs outside of the US in coordination with the De-
partment of State to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation.” Id.
(internal quotations omitted).
167 “Combatting Weapons of Mass Destruction includes offensive operations against
WMD, defensive operations, and managing the consequences of WMD attacks.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted).
168 Social Radar Technologies, supra note 7.
169 Id.
170 Id.
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that Social Radar tools can determine and measure sentiment; identify changes in
sentiment; identify (1) key influencers, (2) who is engaged in the discussion, and (3)
demographics of participants; determine which groups and organizations are manipu-
lating social media and measure their influence; and evaluate courses of action for
possible outcomes and effectiveness of actions.171
In 2015, MITRE “licensed its social analytics technologies to AtrocityWatch, a
[non-]profit [organization] that uses big data to predict and prevent global atrocities.”172
AtrocityWatch is intending to use the technology to help “detect[ ] early warning
signs of major events, such as genocide and war crimes, through crowd sourcing and
data analytics.”173 Tools such as Social Radar may indeed be useful in tracking senti-
ment to prevent atrocity and violence. For example, during the 1994 Rwanda Genocide,
increasingly violent propaganda was used to motivate Hutus to kill Tutsis.174 Horizon-
tal scanning sentiment analysis tools, however, also present the potential for abuse
by military, intelligence, or law enforcement agencies. Because they often rely on pub-
licly available data,175 it is possible that such tools may not fall within the protections
of the Fourth Amendment. However, the mass cybersurveillance of public opinion
and ideas does raise both Fourth Amendment and First Amendment concerns.
CONCLUSION
Social Radar and other horizontal cybersurveillance technologies often rely on
digital information that is made public or can be acquired through other means.
Under the current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, digitized data available at the
government’s disposal for analysis and preemptive decision-making may not be
considered private. The question now posed by the challenges of horizontal cyber-
surveillance is whether indiscriminate mass surveillance that is population-wide is
reasonable or consistent with constitutional values.
Specifically, the need to further intertwine the protections of both the First and
Fourth Amendments is becoming more urgent. Emerging techniques of governing
and policing are increasingly anchored in cybersurveillance technologies.176 These
technologies feed upon developments in big data, the Information Society, the Internet
171 See id.
172 Press Release, MITRE Corp., MITRE Licenses Social Radar Technology to Atrocity-
Watch (May 13, 2015), https://www.mitre.org/news/press-releases/mitre-licenses-social
-radar-technology-to-atrocitywatch [https://perma.cc/BE6P-P457].
173 Id.
174 See, e.g., David Yanagizawa-Drott, Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the
Rwandan Genocide, 129 Q.J. ECON. 1947 (2014).
175 See Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion, Big Data,
and Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15, 33–38 (2016).
176 See Paul Ohm, Electronic Surveillance Law and the Intra-Agency Separation of Powers,
47 U.S.F. L. REV. 269 (2012) (detailing how the U.S. is becoming a surveillance society).
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of Things, and the Digital Economy. Social, political, and economic transformations
track technological transformations.177
The new challenge is to determine what the constitutional response must be
when the danger presented is constant surveillance and digital assessment. What if
the threat is not to be silenced, detained, incarcerated? In a big data world, the threat
flows from digital watchlisting, indiscriminate suspicionless cybersurveillance, data-
basing, and algorithmic decision-making. The consequences of these threats are not
just physical harms, but threats to free agency and natural rights. The byproduct of
surveillance is a chilling effect to associational and expressive freedoms—in short,
the loss of privacy that makes free thought and speech possible. The First and Fourth
Amendments are, as the Supreme Court has acknowledged, intertwined,178 thus a threat
to one in the National Surveillance State may be a threat to the other. It is increasingly
difficult to disentangle which rights are being infringed upon by horizontal cybersur-
veillance and data-driven policing practices.
In the past, surveillance arose in the context of criminal investigation and national
domestic or foreign intelligence gathering. Now surveillance exists merely for the
sake of surveillance—because the technological capacity exists. To preserve the
fundamental democratic freedoms at the core of our Constitution, it is necessary to
examine the relationship between the First and Fourth Amendments in light of
modern cybersurveillance practices and to consider how that relationship may be
used to guard against suspicionless intrusions.
177 See id.
178 See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564–65, 567–68 (1978).
